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How definitive is the standard 
interpretation of Gödel's Incompleteness 
Theorem? 
Bhupinder Singh Anand 
Standard interpretations of Gödel's “undecidable” proposition, [(Ax)R(x)], 
argue that, although [~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable if [(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable, 
we may not conclude from this that [~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable. We show 
that such interpretations are inconsistent with a standard Deduction Theorem 
of first order theories. 
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1.  Introduction 
In his seminal 1931 paper [Go31a], Gödel meta-mathematically argues that his 
“undecidable” proposition, [(Ax)R(x)]1, is such that (cf. [An02b], §1.6(iv)): 
                                               
1 We use square brackets to differentiate between a formal expression [F] and its interpretation “F”, where 
we follow Mendelson’s definition of an interpretation M of a formal theory K, and of the interpretation of a 
formula of K under M ([Me64], p49, §2). 
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If [(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable, then [~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable. 
Now, a standard Deduction Theorem of an arbitrary first order theory states that ([Me64], 
p61, Corollary 2.6): 
If T is a set of well-formed formulas of an arbitrary first order theory K, and if [A] is a 
closed well-formed formula of K, and if (T, [A])|-K [B], then T|-K ([A => B]). 
In an earlier paper ([An02b], Appendix 1), we implicitly assumed, without proof, that:  
(T, [A])|-K [B] holds if, and only if, T|-K [B] holds when we assume T|-K [A]. (*) 
In other words, we assumed that [B] is a deduction from (T, [A]) in K if, and only if, 
whenever [A]2 is a hypothetical deduction from T in K, [B] is a deduction from T in K.  
We then argued, that it should follow (essentially by the reasoning in §2.2 below), that: 
 [(Ax)R(x) => ~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable, 
and, therefore, that: 
[~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable. 
We then concluded that PA is omega-inconsistent. However, these conclusions are 
inconsistent with standard interpretations of Gödel’s reasoning, which, firstly, assert both 
[(Ax)R(x)] and [~(Ax)R(x)] as PA-unprovable, and, secondly, assume that PA can be 
omega-consistent. Such interpretations, therefore, implicitly deny that the PA-provability 
of [~(Ax)R(x)] can be inferred from the above meta-argument; ipso facto, they imply that 
(*) is false. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
2 For the purposes of this paper, we assume everywhere that [A] is a closed well-formed formula of K. 
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In the following sections, we review the Deduction Theorems used in the earlier 
argument, and give a meta-mathematical proof of (*). It follows that the standard 
interpretations of Gödel’s reasoning are inconsistent with a standard Deduction Theorem 
of an arbitrary first order theory ([Me64], p61, Corollary 2.6). We conclude that such 
interpretations cannot be accepted as definitive. 
1.1  An overview 
We first review, in Theorem 1, the proof of a standard Deduction Theorem, if (T, [A])|-K 
[B], then T|-K [A => B], where an explicit deduction of [B] from (T, [A]) is known.  
We then show, in Corollary 1.2, that Theorem 1 can be constructively extended to cases 
where (T, [A])|-K [B] is established meta-mathematically, and where an explicit deduction 
of [B] from (T, [A]) is not known. 
We finally prove (*) in Theorem 2.  
2.  A standard Deduction Theorem 
The following is, essentially, Mendelson’s proof of a standard Deduction Theorem 
([Me64], p61, Proposition 2.4) of an arbitrary first order theory K: 
Theorem 1: If T is a set of well-formed formulas of an arbitrary first order theory K, and 
if [A] is a closed well-formed formula of K, and if (T, [A])|-K [B], then T|-K [A => B]. 
Proof: Let <[B1], [B2], ..., [Bn]> be a deduction of [B] from (T, [A]) in K.  
Then, by definition, [Bn] is [B] and, for each i, either [Bi] is an axiom of K, or [Bi] is in T, 
or [Bi] is [A], or [Bi] is a direct consequence by some rules of inference of K of some of 
the preceding well-formed formulas in the sequence. 
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We now show, by induction, that T|-K [A => Bi] for each i =< n. As inductive hypothesis, 
we assume that the proposition is true for all deductions of length less than n. 
(i) If [Bi] is an axiom, or belongs to T, then T|-K [A => Bi], since [Bi => (A => Bi)] 
is an axiom of K.  
(ii) If [Bi] is [A], then T|-K [A => Bi], since T|-K [A => A].  
(iii) If there exist j, k less than i such that [Bk] is [Bj => Bi], then, by the inductive 
hypothesis, T|-K [A => Bj], and T|-K [A => (Bj => Bi)]. Hence, T|-K [A => Bi]. 
(iv) Finally, suppose there is some j < i such that [Bi] is [(Ax)Bi], where x is a 
variable in K. By hypothesis, T|-K [A => Bj]. Since x is not a free variable of [A], 
we have that [(Ax)(A => Bj) => (A => (Ax)Bj] is PA-provable. Since T|-K [A => 
Bj], it follows by Generalisation that T|-K [(Ax)(A => Bj)], and so T|-K [A => 
(Ax)Bj], i.e. T|-K [A => Bi].  
This completes the induction, and Theorem 1 follows as the special case where i = n. ¶3 
2.1  A number-theoretic corollary 
Now, Gödel has defined ([Go31a], p22, Definition 45(6)) a primitive recursive number-
theoretic relation xB(K, T)y that holds if, and only if, x is the Gödel-number of a deduction 
from T of the K-formula whose Gödel-number is y.  
We thus have: 
Corollary 1.14: If the Gödel-number of the well-formed K-formula [B] is b, and that of 
the well-formed K-formula [A => B] is c, then Theorem 1 holds if, and only if5: 
                                               
3 We use the symbol “¶” as an end-of-proof marker. 
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(Ex)xB(K, T, [A])b => (Ez)zB(K, T)c 
2.2  An extended Deduction Theorem 
We next consider the proposition:  
Corollary 1.2: If we assume Church’s Thesis6, then Theorem 1 holds even if the premise 
(T, [A])|-K [B] is established meta-mathematically, and a deduction <[B1], [B2], ..., [Bn]> 
of [B] from (T, [A]) in K is not known explicitly. 
Proof: Since Gödel’s number-theoretic relation xB(K, T)y is primitive recursive, it follows 
that, if we assume Church’s Thesis - which implies that a number-theoretic relation is 
decidable if, and only if, it is recursive - we can effectively determine some finite natural 
number n for which the assertion nB(K, T, [A])b holds, where the Gödel-number of the well-
formed K-formula [B] is b.  
Since n would then, by definition, be the Gödel-number of a deduction <[B1], [B2], ..., 
[Bn]> of [B] from (T, [A]) in K, we may thus constructively conclude, from the meta-
mathematically determined assertion (T, [A])|-K [B], that some deduction <[B1], [B2], ..., 
[Bn]> of [B] from (T, [A]) in K can, indeed, be effectively determined. 
Theorem 1 follows. ¶ 
                                                                                                                                            
4 We note that Corollary 1.1 and Corollary 2.2 may be essentially different number-theoretic assertions, 
which may not be obviously equivalent; the “obvious” assumption (*), thus, may need a proof. 
 
5 We note that this is a semantic meta-equivalence, based on the definition of the primitive recursive 
relation xB(K, T)y. 
 
6 Church’s Thesis: A number-theoretic function is effectively computable if, and only if, it is recursive 
([Me64], p147, footnote). We appeal explicitly to Church’s Thesis here to avoid implicitly assuming that 
every recursive relation is algorithmically decidable (cf. [An02c], §II(7) Corollary 14.3). In Anand 
([An02g], §2.5(xii)) we show that, under a constructive interpretation of classical foundational concepts, 
Church’s Thesis is a Theorem; such a premise would not, then, be needed. 
 
 6
3.  An additional deduction theorem 
We finally prove (*) as an additional deduction theorem, in an arbitrary first order theory 
K:  
Theorem 2: If K is an arbitrary first order theory, and if [A] is a closed well-formed 
formula of K, then (T, [A])|-K [B] if, and only if, T|-K [B] holds when we assume T|-K [A]. 
Proof: Firstly, if there is a deduction <[B1], [B2], ..., [Bn]> of [B] from (T, [A]) in K, and 
there is a deduction <[A1], [A2], ..., [Am]> of [A] from T in K, then <[A1], [A2], ..., [Am], 
[B1], [B2], ..., [Bn]> is a deduction of [B] from T in K. Hence we have: if (T, [A])|-K [B], 
then T|-K [B] holds when we assume T|-K [A]. 
Secondly, if there is a deduction <[B1], [B2], ..., [Bn]> of [B] from T in K, then we have, 
trivially, that: if T|-K [B] holds when we assume T|-K [A], then (T, [A])|-K [B]. 
Lastly, we assume that there is no deduction <[B1], [B2], ..., [Bn]> of [B] from T in K. If, 
now, T|-K' [B] holds when we assume T|-K' [A] in any consistent extension K' of K, then, if 
we assume that there is a sequence <[A1], [A2], ..., [Am]> of well-formed K'-formulas such 
that [Am] is [A] and, for each m >= i >= 1, either [Ai] is an axiom of K', or [Ai] is in T, or 
[Ai] is a direct consequence by some rules of inference of K' of some of the preceding 
well-formed formulas in the sequence, then we can show, by induction on the deduction 
length n, that there is a sequence <[B1], [B2], ..., [Bn]> of well-formed K-formulas such 
that [B1] is [A]7, [Bn] is [B] and, for each i > 1, either [Bi] is an axiom of K, or [Bi] is in T, 
or [Bi] is a direct consequence by some rules of inference of K of some of the preceding 
well-formed formulas in the sequence.  
                                               
7 [A] is thus the hypothesis in the sequence; it is the only well-formed K-formula in the sequence that is not 
an axiom of K, not in T, and not a direct consequence of the axioms of K by any rules of inference of K. 
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Hence, if there is a deduction <[A1], [A2], ..., [Am]> of [A] from T in K', then <[A1], [A2], 
..., [Am], [B2], ..., [Bn]> is a deduction of [B] from T in K'. By definition, it follows that 
<[B2], ..., [Bn]> is a deduction of [B] from (T, [A]) in K. We thus have: if T|-K [B] holds 
when we assume T|-K [A], then (T, [A])|-K [B].  This completes the proof. ¶ 
In view of Corollary 1.2, we thus have: 
Corollary 2.1: If we assume Church’s Thesis, and if [A] is a closed well-formed formula 
of K, then we may conclude T|-K ([A] => [B]) if T|-K [B] holds when we assume T|-K [A].8 
We note that, in the notation of Corollary 1.1, if the Gödel-number of the well-formed K-
formula [A] is a, then Corollary 2.1 holds if, and only if9: 
Corollary 2.2: ((Ex)xB(K, T)a  => (Eu)uB(K, T)b) => (Ez)zB(K, T)c. 
                                               
8 We note that there is a model-theoretic proof of Corollary 2.1. The case T|-K [B] is straightforward.  
 
If ~ T|-K [B], then, as noted in Theorem 2, if T|-K [B] holds when we assume T|-K [A], then there is a 
sequence <[B1], [B2], ..., [Bn]> of well-formed K-formulas such that [B1] is [A], [Bn] is [B] and, for each i > 
1, either [Bi] is an axiom of K, or [Bi] is in T, or [Bi] is a direct consequence by some rules of inference of 
K of some of the preceding well-formed formulas in the sequence.  
 
(Note: In the following, if T is the set of well-formed K-formulas {[T1], [T2], ..., [Tl]} then (T & [A]) 
denotes the well-formed K-formula [T1 & T2 & ..., Tl & A], and, (T & A) denotes its interpretation in M: T1 
& T2 & ..., Tl & A.) 
 
If, now, any well-formed formula in (T, [A]) is false under an interpretation M of K, then (T & A) => B is 
vacuously true in M.  
 
If, however, all the well-formed formulas in (T, [A]) are true under interpretation in M, then the sequence 
<[B1], [B2], ..., [Bn]> interprets as a deduction in M, since the interpretation preserves the axioms and rules 
of inference of K (cf. [Me64], p57). Thus [B] is true in M, and so is (T & A) => B. 
 
In other words, we cannot have (T, [A]) true and [B] false in M as this would imply that there is some 
consistent extension K' of K in which T|-K' [A], but not T|-K' [B], which is contrary to the hypothesis that, in 
any consistent K in which we assume T|-K [A], we also have T|-K [B]. 
 
Hence, (T & A) => B is true in all models of K. By a consequence of Gödel’s Completeness Theorem for an 
arbitrary first order theory ([Me64], p68, Corollary 2.15(a)), it follows that |-K (T & [A]) => [B]), and, ipso 
facto, that T|-K ([A] => [B]). 
 
9 We note that this, too, is a semantic meta-equivalence, based on the definition of the primitive recursive 
relation xB(K, T)y. 
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4.  Conclusion 
Since standard interpretations of Gödel’s reasoning and conclusions do not admit 
Theorem 2 as a valid inference, such interpretations are inconsistent with the standard 
Deduction Theorem for an arbitrary first order theory [Me64], p61, Proposition 2.4); they 
cannot, therefore, be considered definitive.  
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